88 MARTIAL LAW

Egypt would excite increased distrust, though perhaps
in a lesser degree than on the 5th August, among
neutral nations of British policy, and would be certain
to arouse fierce anger among all classes of Egyptians.
To alienate the sympathies of the first, or to disturb
the existing tranquillity of the second, would be foolish:
and influenced by these considerations His Majesty's
Government rejected annexation. The adoption of
either of the two following alternatives would be a
signal proof, at least, that England had no ignoble or
interested motive in taking up arms. But December
1914 was no moment to undertake hazardous political
experiments, nor was the Egyptian nation in the
circumstances a suitable subject for their trial. No
Treaty, however strictly worded, could guarantee that
Egypt would be faithful to her obligations : rather
was it probable that her population would use the new
political freedom to proclaim their loyalty to Con-
stantinople. To grant independence or autonomy to
a people who not only were unfitted in the opinion of
the guardian to undertake responsible government,
but were out of sympathy with that guardian's situa-
tion, would be attended with grave risk. Great
Britain, fighting for her existence and looking upon
Egypt as the keystone of one arch of her defence,
could not accept the risk. There remained thus only
the fourth alternative. Its adoption in many respects
was a misfortune. To perpetuate deliberately a
state of affairs universally condemned by enlightened
Egyptians as responsible for the embittered feeling
of their nation towards the Occupying Power, was
neither prudent nor statesmanlike : the more so since
that sentiment inevitably must be accentuated by
Great Britain's seizure of the overlordship. Yet
despite its manifest disadvantages the choice of this
form at least permitted His Majesty's Government
to strengthen their hold over Egypt, and provide